THE APPLICATION OF MONEY WRONGFULLY PROCURED, BY A DEFAULTING AGENT OR TRUSTEE,
TO THE PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE
PRINCIPAL'S BUSINESS OR THE TRUST ESTATE.
Problems often arise in the determination of cases which
cannot be settled by any definite and single principle. The common law, being a system of principles applicable to the'general
activities of men, this is frequently bound to occur. It is inconceivable that human foresight of court or legislature should prove
adequate to cope with all possible future contingencies. This
may not be a regrettable condition. Legislation represents but.
contemporaneous economic and social views. Judicial opinion,
in providing for the future, leads to dicta., regarded as binding
on none, and productive of harmful results. Fortunately the
cautiousness of our judges makes this infrequent, though important examples are not wanting.'
It is. therefore, not an unusual instance if it proves true of
the problem, indicated by the somewhat voluminous title appearing above, that no certain rule of definite lax4€ can be called upon
to decide it. To state the problem: May the owner of money or
property, fraudulently secured -or taken from him by one who is
an agent or trustee managing the business or property of another,
and by him, as such agent or trustee, devoted to the payment of
the debts incurred in the business or the conduct of the trust, recover the same at law or in equity from the principal or the trust
estate, the fraud-feasor being a defaulter in a larger amount?
Whenever this, or' closely analogous problems, have been presented, the result has been obtained by the application of general
principles of law and not because of the bearing of any specific
rule.
For the purpose of the investigation, it is thought that the
'Opinion of Matthew. J., in Bowman v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., z-5 U. S.
465, looking forward to the question which later came before the court in
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 1oo.
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matter primarily divides itself into two separate discussions, each.
of which is in turn sub-divided into a treatment of the respective
relationships of trustee and cestni quc trust, and of principal and
agent. The basis of the first division is one of fact. The essentialfacts of the hypotheical case raising th&question. dealing for the
present with agency alone. would be as follows: The agent is
placed in charge of the business of his principal with full authority to do all things necessary to the complete management
thereof: while so engaged he misapl)ropriatcs property or money
of the principal, and, in order to cover his defalcation, lie steals
or fraudulently secures from a third lrson, the plaintiff, money
or property which le converts into money, and uses to pay the
creditors of the business whose claims he should have disclhrged
with the money embezzled; the agent then absconds and the
plaintiff seeks to recover his property or its value from the
principal, claiming that he has had the benefit of it and should
repay.
Two different views may be *takenof these facts. First, the
agent used the money fraudulently secured to pay his debt to the
principal, and thereafter immediately drew upon the principal's money in his hands to pay the dehts of the business. Seconed, that the agent directly paid the debts of the business with
the plaintiff's money. It is proposed. therefore, to approach the
question from both standpoints and within each to treat both the
relations of trust and of agency.
I.
A. PIUNCIPAL

AND AGENT.

It is clear that. st long as the money of the plaintiff remained
in the hands of the agent. it was the plaintiff's money. He could
follow it and take it from the agent: and, so long as lie could
identify it or its product, lie could claim a preference over the
general credtitoi's of the agent to the extent, at least, to which the
latter had defrauded him.2 Did it cease to be the plaintiff's
"Followm'in
Misappropriated Property into its Product," by James Barr
Ames. 19 Harv. .. Rev. 511. Re Halleti. 13 (h. D. 696: Lehman v. Gunn,
124 Ala. 213: JI-1mes v. (,ihnan. 138 \. Y. 360. -It is now well settled that
,1C who ha.- been deprived ni hi, property by frau.. by theft, or by any
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money when the agent paid it in discharge of tie obligation to
his principal arising from his default? This -must depend upon
whether the principal is a purchaser for value without notice.
If he-is, the trust, attached to the specific money or property in
favor of the plaintiff, is extinguished: and the principal, now the
defendant, is free from any liability to the plaintiff, at law or
in equity,- unless some principle of law other than the doctrine of
following trust monies can be invoked. If the principal is not
in the situation of a purchaser for value without notice, the
plaintiff may recover from him, subject only to one further qualification,, that he cannot claim other than as a general creditor,
unless he can now identify some specific property in the estate
of the defendant, as the product of his money, 4 or at least show
that the assets of the defendant have been swollen by the amount
thereof. " But, in any event he would be entitled- to recover judgment for the amount of his property which had been received 6i
the principal. 6 What then is the exact position of the defendant?
It is clear that lie is a holder for value, for the money was received, if it can be said to have been received by him at all, in
payment of the pre-existing debt of the agent.- But is lie without
legal notice? By hypothesis he is without actual notice, and therefore, if lie is to be charged with constructive notice it must be
because, by some rule of agency, he is charged with the notice his
agent had at the time of the payment of the agent's debt to him.
This makes necessary a consideration of those circumstances
under which the knowledge of an agent in a particular transaction is imputed to the principal to charge him with notice of facts
and countervailing equities known to the agent.
As a general proposition. it is well established that notice to
wrongful conversion. may charge the fraudulent vendee. the thief, or othei
wrongful converter as a constructive trustee of any property received in
exchange for the misappropriated property."
'Taylor v. Blacklock. 32 Ch. 1). 56o; Wright v. Leys. 8 Ont. 88; Holly v.
Protestant Episcopal Church. 18o U. S. 284 (igoi) ; Whittle v. Vanderbilt
Mining Co.. 83 Fed. 48 (i)7) : Ruff's Appeal, too Pa. 531.
'Metropolitan Bank v. Campbell Co.. 77 Fed. 705: Seiter v. Moore, j82
Ill. 351; Little v. Chadwick. i5i Mass. 1o9: Twohy v. Melbyc, 78 Minn. 357;
Perth Co. v. Middlesex Bank. 6o X. J. 1(q. 84; Lebanon Bank, 166 Pa. 622.
£Corn. Nat. Bank Y. Armstrong. 148 U. S. 50 (1893).
' Cases cited in notes 4 and 5.

'Swift v. Tyson. 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
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an agent in .aparticular transaction is notice to the principal.'
This rule is made one of presumption. It is the affirmative duty
of the agent to disclose to his principal -all relevant facts coming to
his knowledge in the course of the performance of his duty.9
And in case of a failure so to disclose material 'facts within his
knowledge, the agent is liable to his principal for any loss-in
consequence thereof.' 0 This is a duty which the law conclusively
presumes that the agent has performed.'
But if the circumstances are such that this presumption becomes an absurdity, the law rejects the presumption. So where
the agent is engaged in a tra'nsactiofi in which he is interested
adversely to his principal or engaged in a scheme to defraud the
latter, so that it is certain the agent will -not perforrh this duty,.it is held that the principal will not be charged with the knowledge
The reason- is stated to be that, where the'comof the agent.'
munication of such a fact would necessarily prevent the consummation of a fraudulent scheme which the agent is engaged in
pei-petrating. a clear presumption is'raised that he would not
communicate that fact. 14 A divergent reason for the exception
also appears in Massachusetts. "The true reason for the exception is that an independent fraud committed by an agent on his
own account is beyond the scope of his employment, and, therefore, knowledge of it, as a matter of law, cannot be imputed to
'Pine 'Mountain, etc., Co. v. Bailey, .o4Fed. 258 (C. C. A. j899) ; Lewis v.
Equitable Mortgage Co.. 21 S. E. 224 (Ga. 1894); Clark -v.Wheeling Bank,
17 Pa. 322.

'Pringle v. Modern Woodmen of Amer., 113 N. W. 231 (Neb.); Dorr
v. Camden. 46 S. F. 1014 (W. Va.); Machar v. Vandewater, 26 Grant, Ch.
(U. C.) 83, distinguishing between the disclosure required of one making
a sale for himself, and that required of the same person, when he is no
longer acting as a vendor, but is engaged to act as agent of a vendee to
procure shares from others.
17; Arrott v. Brown, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 9.
"Norris v. Taylor, 49 Ill.
"Bierce v. Red Bluff Hotel Co.. 31 Cal. x6o; Ward's Appeal, 172 Pa. 185;
Armstrong v. Ashley. 204 U. S. 272; Bawden Y. Lond6n, etc., Assur. Co.
(1892). 2 Q. B. 534. One case at least, has rested the rule on the identity of
the principal with the agent. Mountford v. Scott. 3 'Madd. 40.
Fry. J.. in Cave v. Cave, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 639 (188o).
"Willimantic Bank v. Bevin. 72 Conn. 666; Bank v. Nichols Co., 223 Ill.
41; United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 185 Pa. 586; Amer. Sur.
Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. . 133." Inneraritv v. Mercliant's Vat. Bank. 137 Mass. 332 (1885), and cases
in preceding note. And see In re European Bank, L. R. 5 Ch.358.
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the principal." ", But whatever may be'the reason for the exception it stands, with the rule, as u'ndoubted law.'6 "
It may perhaps be useful to investigate the different reasons
given by various authorities in support 6f the rule. One of these
reasons, already outlined and depending upon the duty of the
agent to inform his principal of the material facts, is most frequently recognized, not only by writers on agency but by the
courts. "a The other reason, quoted above from the later Massachusetts case, is adopted by one text writer.I1b As pointed out,
it has been noticed by the Federal courts. It is discussed at some
length by the Georgia court, 16c but not definitely adopted. It
should be noted that in every instance in which this reason appears, it is stated as a reason for the exception only; thatis,
where the agent is engaged in an independent fraud. Suppose
the agent is not so engaged, but is acting in the interest of his
superior. In such cases, the same authorities agree that the principal is charged with the agent's knowledge. Is this general rule
based upon the affirmative statement of the negative reason
given for the exception? This can hardly be so, for it is stated
in terms of imputati6n, thus: "The knowledge of the agent,
acting within the scope of his employment, is the knowledge of
the principal, for it is presumed that the agent has communicated
' Allen v. So. Boston Ry. Co., 1so Mass. 200 (1889).
For a possible explanation of this view in Massachusetts. reference may be made to Mussey
v. Beecher, 57 Mass. 51i (j849). where it is held that false representations
made by an agent not for the benefit of his employer, are not binding upon
the latter; i. c., are outside the scope of the employment. The doubt which
may exist as to this reason is that though. the act irl question is clearly within
the scope of the agent's employment, the exception is made. Thus in Bank
of Overton v. Thompson. 56 C. C. A. 554 (190), a bank cashier engaged
in business with one Thompson. the plaintiff, and became possessed of a draft
as their joint property, and acting wholly alone in the matter, and without
the intervention of any other agent or officer of the bank, deposited the same
to his own account. Later he withdrew the entire amount of his deposit and
embezzled the moneys belonging to the bank. Thompson sought to charge
the bank as trustee of his share of the draft, alleging that it had' notice of
his interest therein. Judgment for Thompson was reversed. The receipt
of the deposit of the draft of the cashier was clearly an act within the scop
of his authority. But see a perhaps ambiguous statement involving both
reasons for the exception. but recognizing that above in Thomson-Houston
Elec. Co. v.Cap. Elec. Co.. 12 C. C. A. 643. by Taft, Cir. J.
Kennedy v.Green. 3 3dyl. & K. 69o (1834) : Mechem Agency, sec. 723.
"a Innerarity v. Merchants' Nat. Bank. supra; Mechem Agency, sec. 719, 1
Clark & Skyle's Agency, io55- Bowstead Agency. 339; 31 Cyc. 595.
.'b
Wade on Notice, sec. 69o.
'c Morris v. Georgia Loan Co., jor) Ga. 12, 23-24 (18gg).
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such facts to the principal." l6d Thus it appears a presumption
must be indulged in, and the reason for the general rule cannot
be stated without it. So it follows that wherever a principal is
said to have imputed to him the kiowledge of his agent, it must
be because of circumstances giving rise td a presumption of disclosure. 'Merely to say that because an agent was acting in the
scope of his employment, notice to him is notice to the principal,
without any reason why it is so, is to construct a non sequitur.
Where the circumstances are such as to give rise to the -presumption, it is conclusive to a certain extent; me -for while the principal cannot be heard to prove it untrue in fact, he may overthrow
the basis of the presumption by showing the existence of circumstances which make it. more prbbable that his agent served himself; that is, an opposing interest. But it shouldbe borne in mind
that, in the final analysis. there is no difference between the reasons upon which the general rule is said to rest;.both depend upofi
a presumption of disclosure.
Irrespective of the reasons, how are these rules to be applied
to the present question? It is certain that the fraudulent agent
acts under circumstances which give rise to a presumption that
he will hot disclose the defect in his title to the money with which
he discharges his obligation to the principal. The very purpose
of the payment is to onceal his embezzlement. Therefore, the
present is a case in which to apply the exception, and-the principal
should not be charged with notice of facts known to the agent
in the transaction. It follows that the principal is without notice
of the plaintiff's right in the money and must be classed as a
holder for value without notice. The money of the plaintiff
having come into his hands, the right of the plaintiff is cut off,
and he can no longer either follow it or its product in specie, or
recover the amount- as a general creditor.' 7
But it has recently been suggested S that an exception should
be engrafted on the exception just indicated, and that the present
Story Agency, sec. 14o.
't Jacquith v. Davenport, i91
'Mass. 415.
"'

" Amer. Exch. Bank v. Theummeler. z95 II. 9o (1902) ; Garrison v. Union
Tr. Co.. 339 Mich. 392 (19o). New Zealand Co. v. ,Vatson. 7 Q. B. D. 374.
"Newell v. Hadley. 92 N. E. ro7 (Mass. 19m). opinion by Mr. Justice
Loring; Mr. Chief Justice Knowlton dissenting.
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case will fall within that sub-exception, and the result be that the
knowledge of the agent is imputable to the principal, and he is
therefore liable for the return of the plaintiff's money. The
defendant is held to have notice because "the agent and the agent
alone acted for the defendant in receiving the attempted payment." : The doctrine is announced that an agent's knowledge of
his own fraud is to be imputed to the principal in a transaction
where the agent alone .represents the principal, irrespective of the
adverse interest of the agent. Thus it is said, referring to the defendants, "They must be deemed to have known what lie knew." 20
Mr. Justice Loring recognizes the main exception by which the
knowledge is not imputed. but maintains that the basis of that exception is that the defendant is represented by an innocent person
or acts himself in the premises, and lays the entire stress of his
argument for the exception to the exception on the fact that the"thief and no one else received for that other the payment so
made." 21 The length to which, this goes marks its importance.
If A is the agent of B, and. being in default to his principal, steals
money from C and pays his debt by handing it to B as his (A's)
money, B takes a title good against C; whereas if A being intrusted with B's moneys, from which lie has purloined ihe amount
to be repaid, places C's ioney with the other as his payment to
B and the squaring of his account, A alone acting in receiving it,
B does not have a good title, though the next minute A pays the
money to discharge debts which he is authorized and in duty
bound to pay from the funds of B in his possession.
It is conceived that this rule of agency is new in so far, at
least, as it is expressed in terms of an imputation of the agent's
knowledge to the principal.- It is further suggested, that though
it may be arguable that the elements of this proposition make it
in other terms supportable. a question noticed at greater length
hereafter, it is not sound as stated, and insufficient to allow the plaintiff to recover.
This new rule has been advanced in several cases; in manN
rejected absolutely, in others decided against, where if it had been
21

Idem. p. 512.
Idem, p. 512.

I dem, p. .512.
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adopted, contrary results must have been reached, and in a few
recognized apparently in words, but as will be argued later; without conscious meaning so to state the rule.
The facts of Bank of Overton v. Thompson have been giVen
in a preceding note." In that case no one acted for the bank save
the cashier, who was committing a fraud on the plaintiff, under
circumstances where, if he disclosed the true character of the
transaction to the bank, his plans would have been frustrated. It
was held that the knowledge possessed by the agent was not imputable to the principal, though it was the fraud-feasor himself
who, as cashier, took the money into the bank-.2 The argument
was made that as the cashier alone represented the defendant in
the transaction, the former's knowledge should be imputed; but
this was expressly denied, since the interest of the agent 'was
such that the presumption. was against disclosure.
In National 'Bank of Nephi v. Foote,2 4 a bank cashier procured the signature of the defendant to a note on a condition pre"cedent that it should not be used until a third person had signed
as joint maker. Without complying therewith, the cashier, who
alone acted in the matter for the bank, discounted the note. In
an action by the bank on the note, the defendant claimed the
cashier's knowledge of the condition was imputable to the bank,
he having solely represented the latter. Merritt, C. J., took occasion to review the authorities and characterized the principle in
question as "a distinction which seems to us less substantial than
technical and we cannot give it our assent. * * * In a case
where the presumption arises that an agent will not communicate
his knowledge'to his principal, it would seem to be unreasonable
to hold the principal responsible for- the knowledge of the agent
solely because the agent in the particular transaction appeared
himself for the principal. The presumption would naturally be,
in such case that he would fail to act upon such knowledge as the
principal would act, just as he would fail to impart his knowledge
where another appeared for the principal." 2'
Note i, supra.
56 C. C. A. 554. 556, per Lochren, Dist. J.
x2 Utah, 157 (1895).
Idem, pp. i6g-17o.
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In New York the doctrine seems to be followed that where
the principal is a corporation, the knowledge of the agent, who
alone represents the corporation, is imputable to the latter though
his interest was adverse and such that a presumption of nondisclosure would ordinarily arise. "' Folger, J., said, "Had the
principal been an entity, it would have been his duty to have communicated the knowledge in his mind to that principal. Not
being an entity, but touching other persons and acting in his own
business through him as an agent, his material knowledge became
its knowledge." While the possible distinction between a principaI
in natura persona and an artificial principal is not clearly brought
out, the trend of the opinion indicates a thought in the'mind of
the court that since a corporation can act only through its agents,
when the agent with knowledge alone acts in the premises, and no
innocent agent is interposed who can be said to represent the corporate principal, it is as if the principal himself were acting had it
been the case of a natural person; ' It should perhaps be noted
'Holden v. New York & Eiie Bank, 72 N. Y. 286 (1878). A trustee who
was president and managing officer of the bank, transferred stock of the
bank which he knew to be worthless from his own name to himself as trustee,
.and in payment drew on his trustee account and deposited in his personal
account, and subsequently withdrew his entire balance. In an action to set
aside th transfer and recover the money drawn from the trust account, it
was held that the bank was chargeable with the knowledge possessed by its
president in making the transfers.
212 Thompson Corp., sec. 1645 (2nd Ed. I9Wo).
"As corporations, from
their nature, can never act except through the instrumentality of their agents
* * * this principle applies with peculiar force to them." See also Brobston v. Penniman, 25 S. E. 350 (Ga. 8)5). "These cases all proceed upon
the idea that as a corporation must of necessity intrust its affairs to officers
and agents, and can transact business only through their agency, it must be
held chargeable with their acts in the performance of their duty to it; and,
if its duly selected servants prove unfaithful to their trust, the corporation
itself must suffer rather innocent third persons."
In First National Bank v. Blake, 6o Fed. 78, Cornish held a note as a
pledge to be returned upon a certain contingency. He was president and
general manager of the plaintiff bank, and as such discounted the note for
himself. Held: The knowledge of the condition was imputed to- the bank.
"If Cornish was the sole representative of the bank in the transaction with
himself, there was no one from whom information could have been concealed
or to whom it could have been commzunicated. If he was the sole representative of each party, each must have had equal knowledge. He must necessarily
know as much in one capacity as another." While this decision is contra to the
prevailing authority in the federal courts, it places the doctrine applied upon
the ground that in the case of a corporate principal, there is no one from
whom concealment could be made or knowledge given. It is suggested that
the whole doctrine of imputed notice in regard to corporate principals, at
least so far as it concerns the agency of higher officers, as director, president,
or cashier, rests upon different grounds than when applied to principals in
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that in the decision nothing is said as to the exception generally
recognized when the interest of the agent is adverse to the principal. A few' years later the INew York Supreme Court held the
principal chargeable with the knowledge of the agent where the
agent with the knowledge of the fraud alone represented the bank
in discounting the note, though his interest was adverse.-" In-this
case a distinction is expressly drawn between the facts there and in
a case where, though the three fraud-feasors were directors bf the
bank, none of them was present at any meeting of the board of
directors when action was taken in the matter, and in no way
acted for the bank in the transactions. 2 In the latter case it was
held that under the circumstances, knowledge possessed by the
directors engaged in the conspiracy, could not be attributed to the
bank. But in the Court of Appeals the exception, that knowledge
should not be imputed, was recognized by an undivided court in
a case in which the agent alone acted in the matter and in direct
opposition to the interests of the principal,-a private individual."
This decision was followed subsequently in the Supreme Court in
regard to a natural person."
The doctrine of the New York cases has not been followed
with unifornity. In Iowa it has been denied. :" In that case the
defendant's cashier on his personal account, fraudulently pronatura persona.

The doctrine does not depend upon any presumption of

disclosure, but exists because such an agent of a corporation is its alter ego.
In no other way than by notice to such agents can notice be given to a
corporation. It is, therejore. submitted, the exception based upon circumstances giving rise to a presumption of non-disclosure in the ordinary case,
cannot apply in cases of corporate principals save an ignorant or innocent
agent is interposed to act for the corporation; that is, some one from whom
information can be concealed or to whom it-might be imparted. The quotation above is expressly approved in Cook v.Amer., etc.. Co.. 28 R. 1. 41 (19o6),
by Douglas, C. J., at p. 76. It is further said, *'Weare constrained to hold
with these cases upon grounds of public policy, which require that a corporation shall be held responsible for knowledge which is possessed by those
whom it appoints to represent it.

From the nature of its constitutim if can.

have no other knowletge than that of its officers." And in Nat. Sec. Bank Y.
Cushman, 121 Mass. 490 (1877). Morton. J.. said: "But if a director who
has knowledge acts for the bank in discounting the note. his act is the act
of the bank, and the bank is affected with his knowledge. : ba:k or other
corporation can act only through its officers or other agents."
"Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Tracy. 77 Hun. 443 (1894).
Mayor, etc., New York v. Tenth Nat. Bank. i i i X. Y.446 (t888).
*Henry v. Allen. 15I N. Y. t (1896).

Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank. 60 App. Div. 241 (N. Y. igoi).
Hummel v. The Bank of Monroe. 75 Iowa, 689 (x888).
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cured the plaintiff to make to him his accommodation note, which
he negotiated for a draft, and acting wholly alone in the matter,
cashed the draft as cashier of the defendant.' It was held that
the bank was not chargeable with the knowledge of the fraudulent agent. In this case the bank was not seeking to retain the
proceeds of the draft, but it was an effort by the plaintiff to follow
the draft as proceeds of the note, and therefore dependent upon
whether the bank wa s a holder without notice. In Nex- Jersey
the New York cases have not been followed. ".3 'The president of
a defendant bank knew the note in question, payable to and endorsed by him. was based upon an illegal consideration. He discounted it for the bank and the latter was held entitled to recover.
A decision in New Hampshire is distinguishable. 4 The cashier'
of bank received the defendant's money and gave a receipt therefor in the name of the bank. He did not credit the plaintiff upon
the books, but credited his own account, and subsequently withdrew it and absconded. It was contended the bank was not liable
on the receipts, the cashier's act having been done in pursuit of an
independent, fraudulent scheme for his own benefit, and without
the knowledge of the bank, but the liabilityv was imposed. "The
bank's promise, not the cashier's fraud, is th

foundation of the

plaintiff's action. The independent fraud- did not affect this
promise." 3
The intermediate court in Missouri has apparently recognized the doctrine in question where the agent with knowledge
and in pursuance of a fraudulent scheme of his own' alone represented the bank in making transfers of bank shares on the transfer books, to his own name as trustee. : It is perhaps significant
that no argument was advanced or notice taken of the rule that
where the agent is acting under circumstances which raise the presumption of non-disclosure, his knowledge is not imputable to
the principal. In Pennsylvania. the court has affirmed the conclusions of an auditor in which the doctrine of Holden v. New
'Graham v. Orange Co. Nat. Bank, 35 AtI. 1052 (N. J. t896).
,4Hanson v. Heard. 38 AtI. 788 (N. H. t897).
" Idem, p. -89.
"Withers v. Lafayette Co. Bank. 67 Mo. App. Iu5 (i896).
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York, etc., Bank, supra, was adopted.37 It issubmitted that this
case is not strong authority to support the proposition dependent
upon the fact that the agent with knowledge alone represented
the principal. In the first place, the well-recognized exception was left unnoticed by the auditor and court. It was not
argued at the bar so far as the briefs disclose. And secondly, the
action is one by the bank to enforce the notes received by the act
of the agent, a circumstance to-be noted hereafter.a8
The Federal court has been uniform in holding- that the.
knowledge of the agent acting under circumstances rendering-it
improbable that he would disclose his knowledge, is not to be
imputed to the principal, although the latter is a corporation, and
the fraudulent agent alone represents it in the transaction. a9 Certain drafts werq accepted and delivered to the payee on a condition precedent that he would lend an equal sui to the drawer.
In fraud of the acceptor the payee indorsed the same to a corporation of which he was president and credited the drawer's
account, he alone acting for the corporation. The latter was held
to be a holder for value without notice, and recovered on the
paper from the acceptor. An interesting case in the Supreme
Court should settle the Federal law on the matter.40 The adoption
of the principle of the sub-exception would have necessitated a
different result. The action was brought by a bank receiver
against a surety on a cashier's bond. Prior to the execution of
the bond, the president and cashier had conspired to rob the
bank. The surety company required a certificate from the bank
of the cashier's good reputation to accompany the application.
This certificate was made by the president alone in representation
of the bank and without the knowledge of aliy director. It was
held in an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, that the president's
knowledge of the cashier's dishonesty could not be imputed to the
"Millward-Cliff Cracker Co's Estate, 161 Pa. 151 (1894).
" Infra, p. 240. And note this same circumstance in Merchants' Nat. Bank

v. Tracy, supra; in Holden v. Bank, supra, the deposit by the fraudulent pres-

ident in his personal account extinguished an overdraft for which the bank
sought to retain.
"Levy-Cohn

Mule Co. v. Kauffmann, 114 Fed. 170 (C. C. A. 1902).

also Bank v. Tompkins, 57 Fed.
Vt. 594 (1898).

20

"Ainerican Surety Co. v. Pauly,

See

(C. C. A.); Brandon Bank v. Briggs, 70
17o

U. S. 133 (i898).
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bank so as to make it responsible as chargeable with the misrepresentations contained in the certificate.4 0 After reviewing the
cases, it is said, "Further citation of authorities would seem to be
unnecessary to support the proposition that if Collins gave the
certificate that he might, with the aid of O'Brien as cashier, carrvy
out his purpose to defraud the bank for his personal benefit, the
law will not presume that lie communicated to the bank what he
had done in order to promote the scheme devised by him in hostility to its interests." 41 The decision of Mr. Justice Lurton in
Niblack v. Cosler 4-1 is frequently cited in support of the proposition which depends upon the fact that the agent with knowledge
alone represented the principal in the transaction, but that case is
learly distinguished, and falls within the general rule that the
notice to the agent is imputable to the principal, for from the
finding of facts, there was no adverse interest in the agent.
In Georgia the doctrine of the New York cases has bein
followed. 43 The president and cashier of the bank made a partnership note without authority, to" raise their contributions to
the firm. Acting alone for the bank they loaned themselves
money on the partnership note. In a suit of the bank on the
note, it was held that the knowledge of. its agents was notice to
the bank and neither the partnership nor its other members was
liable on the note. In Rhode Island this case is followed upon
similar facts.4 4 There is a dictum to the same effect in Con45
necticut.
Before attempting a summary of these cases, the authorities
cited by Mr. Justice Loring in the late Massachusetts case should
be examined. He takes his authority from two earlier cases in
the same state. At the outstart it may be pointed out that both
rest upon principles of ratification and though, perhaps unfortunately, stated in words of imputation of notice, the language,
*Idem, p. i59.
41
8o Fed. 596 (C. C. A. 1897). At p. 599, Mr. Justice Lurton, then Circuit Judge. says, "it is unnecessary to consider the application of this principle
to this case. for the reason that the facts do not show that D. was, acting tor
himself or for any firm or corporation in which he had an interest."
' Brobston v. Penniman, supra.
" Cook v. Amer.. etc., Co.. supra.
" Bank of Milford v. Town of Milford, 36 Conn. 93.
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when read in connection with the facts of the cases; leaves this
beyond doubt.
The first of these cases is Atlantic Bank v. Merchants'
Bank." The defaulting teller of the defendant bank secured by
fraud on the plaintiff bank, the sum of money sought to be recovered in the action, in reality, not to make any payment, of
his debt to the defendant, but merely to cover up his shortage for
a day and with intent ioreturn it the next morning. But in one
view of the case, acknowledgd to be dictiu, the court treated
it as a payment to the bank of the teller's debt, the money not
being returned as intended and the fraud being discovered on the
suicide of the teller. Shaw, C. J., held the plaintiff was'entitled
to recover. It will be noted that here the position of the defendant bank is to hold affirmatively-that which solely by the fraudulent act of its agefit. though outside the scope of his authority,
has been brought into its possession. In refusing re-payment -with
knowledge of the circumstances. the defendant ratified that act
of the agent, and must therefore ratify the fraud and all.47 The
court, it is true, speaks of notice to the agent as constructive
notice to the bank, but the facts of the case show that it is not
the notice that is material but the affiimative retention of the
benefit thereby secured.
The other case, Atlantic Mills v. Indian Orchard Mills,4 8 is
similar. The same person was treasurer of both plaintiff and
defendant corporations, and was a defaulter to a large amount.
To cover his shortage temporarily, he transferred property of
one to the credit of thel other. It was held not to be a real payment and the money could be recovered. The writer of the
opinion 49 then proceeded to deal with the case as if the defaulter
had taken the money of the plaintiff, paid it to himself as treasurer of the defendant in discharge of his defalcation. and that
this was the payment the defendant sought to retain. Even in
this view of the case. it is said recovery must be allowed. - Again
the court uses language sustaining the ru!e stated by Mr. Justice
xo Gray, 532 (1858).
"Idem. p. 552.
147
1 Mass. 268, 17 N. E. 496 (1888).
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Loring, "Want of knowledge cannot in the view of tie w. exist,
where the party in the transaction is represented solely by one
who has knowledge." 50 But the exact meaning of that language
is indicated by what immediately follows: "The rule is general,
that if one who assumes to do an act which will be for the benefit of another, commits a fraud in so doing, and the person for
whose benefit the fraud will enure seeks, after knowledge of the
fraud, to avail himself of that act and to retain the benefit of it,
he must be held to adopt the whole act, fraud and all and to be
charged with the knowledge of it, so far at least as relates to his
right to retain the benefit so secured." All that the learned court
had in mind was a ratification of the conduct of him who received
the money for the defendant by the affirmative retention of it
after knowledge. There was no intention to state a definite rule
foi the imputation of knowledge; and, in the absence of an act of
ratification, there would have been no liability on this viiw of
the case. However, the defendant sought to retain that which
was in his hands by the receipt of an agent who had notice. By
so doing he, ihough heretofore without knowledge, ratified that
receipt and all the knowledge which the receiver had in taking
it in discharge of the defalcation. This beinj the sole principle
in' the mind of the court, this case and the preceding one, though
only dicta in this connection, are undoubtedly correct. If more
was meant to be decided, grave doubt must exist as to their
soundness. Considering the facts and all that can be gathered
from a reading of the entire opinions, any further meaning is.
improbable.
Having reviewed the available cases bearing on the question where the fraudulent agent alone acts for the principal, they
may be briefly summarized. They are, as has been indicated,
divisible into three classes. First. the cases in the Federal courts,
Utah and Iowa have expressly denied the validity of a doctrine
charging the principal with notice because the fraudulent agent
alone represented him. provided the interest of the agent is
adverse. Second, if the doctrine had been adopted as a principle
of imputation of knowledge, contrary results would have been
reached in cases noted above, in the Supreme Court of the
"Idem, p. 275.
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t fi.
aid in Massa-.
United States, in New York, in Missourt
5
2
chusetts.
Third, a class of cases in which the doctrine has
been apparently applied and notice charged to the principal. In
these cases three things are noticeable. In but few of them was
the general exception based upon adversity of interest, presented
to the court. In all of them the principal was a corporation, and.
has
in all but the last two cases from Massachusetts. a bank. 'It
been pointed out in a previous note that this may bear upon the
question of notice. " And finally in every case in which the new
rule has been applied, there is clear ratification by the principal,
in its very position in the litigation, of the act of the agent who
had knowledge of the facts in question. Thus in all the cases of
discount, the bank has been seeking to recover on the paper, in its
hands solely by the act of the fraudulent agent. That is with
knowledge of the fraud, it is seeking to retain the benefit derived
therefrom. No clearer case could arise for the application of the
doctrine of ratification in solido. In the stock transfer cases the
same considerations are present. In the two Massachusetts cases
cited by Loring, J., the actual property -of the third person was
held by the principal. This class of cases seems to have been
confined to these three questions.
In Georgia the -true basis of the cases apparently applying
the new rule, is recognized as the doctrine of ratification. "Where
an individual has an interest in a promissory note which-he knows
was given without consideration, and such individual as cashier
of a bank, and without reference to or consultation with any
other officer of the bank, discounts said note with the funds of
the bank, the latter is not a bona fide purchaser of the note without notice. If it ratifies the act of its officer and clairfis title to
the note, it must take it subject to the knowledge which the
officer -who discounted it had at the time." " A year later this
language is quoted with approval and applied in a similar case
to hold the bank chargeable with the knowldge of its sole repre"First Nat. Bank of Trenton v. Badger Lumber Co.. 54 Mo. App. 327
(1893) ; Case v. Hammond Pkg. Co., io5 Mo. App. x68 (i904).
Thatcher v Pray. 113 Mass. 291 (1873).
"See note 27, supra.
Morris v. Georgia Loan Co.. 109 Ga. 12 (1899).
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sentative in discounting a note, though his interest was adverse. 3
The matter was finally summed up in a later case, when the court
said, after reviewing all the prior decisions in that state and many.
elsewhere, "The decision in each of these cases was based upon
the proposition that a c.orporation which seeks to cnforce for its
o1n benefit a contract made in its behalf by one of its officers,
is in law, chargeable W"ith notice of whatever he knew at the time
the contract was entered into." 56 In that case, the fraudulent
director presented the paper to the cashier who had no knowledge
of equities existing between prior parties, and the court distinguishing the case, held that the bank was not charged with the
director's knowledge. The act by which it had possession of the
paper was the act of the cashier, and therefore an assertion of
rights in the paper was not the affirmative claim of the benefit of
the act of a fraud-feasor and so there was no imputation of the
knowledge. This view has been expressly adopted and approved
in Rhode Island in one of the most recent cases on the subjectY7
There seems to be no doubt that this is the correct view. No
cases have been fourid in which it has been questioned, but on the
contrary wherever the point has been raised, it has been adopted
as the reason upon which the rule rests.
If these cases may not be justified on the principle of
ratification, or because they invariably raise questions of the
representation of a corporation by its higher officers, it might be
asked what a priorireasons may be given to support the doctrine
that where the principal is represented solely by the agent with
knowledge, he is charged therewith, but that where there is no
such limited representation, he is not to be charged with notice,
not actually had, if the interest of the agent is adverse? In
the cases affirming this doctrine no reasons are advanced save
the general rule. that the knowledge of the agent is the knowledge of the principal. But as has been pointed out, the jurisdictions which acknowledge the doctrine, notably New York,
recognize the exception which exists to that general rule, that
the knowledge of an agent acting adversely to the interests of
"Fonche v..Mcrchants' Nat. Bank, iio Ga. 827 (xgoo).
" People's Bank v. Exch. Bank, x16 Ga. 82o (x9o2).
" Cook v. Amer., etc., Co., supra.
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his principal is not to be imputed to the latter.:
Thus in one
case the plaintiff intrusted money to his agent to deposit in the
defendant bank, and the agent deposited it in his own name,
taking a memorandum check as evidence thereof and represesenting to the bank it would not be used but returned, after showing to the plaintiff for the purpose of effecting a settlement of
partnership accounts between them. The agent fraudulently indorsed the check to the plaintiff, drew the account out on regular
checks and absconded. He alone represented the plaintiff in the
transaction. In an action on the nemorandun check against
the bank it was held the knowledge of the agent was noi
knowledge of the principal, and recovery allowed..O Why
should the exception be followed in such a case, and not where
the case involves the discounting of paper by a bank or similar
transaction'and a subsequent suit on the paper by the baik? In
each the'singleness of representation is equal. In each the interest of the agent bears the same -degree of adversity to the
principal. As has been pointed out before, the imputation of
notice must depend in the final analysis, upon a presumption of
disclosure6'. The conclusive presumptioni against disclosure is
as great in one case as in another. " It is submitted therefore,.
that the cases in effect announcing the doctrine. that despite the
adversity of interest, the agent's knowledge is charged to the
principal where the agent alone represents the principal in the
transaction. depend upon entirely different principles from .those
which deal with the imputation of notice, and are merely examples of the application of the rule of ratification in solido.
Therefore unless the facts of any particular, case show ratification on the part of the principal, if the interest of the agent
is adverse. his knowledge in the transaction is not chargeable to
his principal, even though he alone, acts in the matter.
To again take tip the thread of the original investigation,
it must now be remembered that by the hypothesis, the money
of the plaintiff paid by the fraudulent agent in discharge of
Henry v. Allen. snprz; Peoples Bank v. Exch. Bank, supra.
Henry v. Allen. supra.
- . lute. p. 230.
1 llumiel v.lal id Monroc. supra: Rank v. Foote. supra.
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his debt to the defendant, has been paid out in turn by the -agent.
in discharge of the debts of the defendant's business. No
notice of the plaintiff's rights is imputable to the defendant. It
only remains to discover whether the problem can be solved
in. favor of the plaintiff on the authority of the cases last considered through the principle deduced from themn by Mr. Justice
Loring has been abandoned. Is there, then, any ratification'or
adoption by the defendant, of the act of the agent in receiving
the payment of the debt to his principal from himself? If so
the case should properly be governed by the authoritie above.
There is no conduct on the part of the defendant, principal
which can be said to be on a .par with the act'of a bank in
bringing suit on a note discounted b" its cashier for himself, nor
of th6 bank in affirmatively seeking to retain the hctual money
paid to it by the agent as in the two leading Massachusetts cases.
The position of the defendant is very different fron asserting'
an affirmative right when he is defensively protesting an enforced outlay. That his creditors have been satisfied, and' will
not -present claims, is the result of no affirmative' act'of him, or
of any one else adopted by him. That there is no ratification
or adoption seems almost self-evident. The authorities on the
question of adoption by passive acceptance of the benefit, while
not without some difference of expression, uniformly support this
view.Y- The conclusion follows that the principal should not be
bound by the notice to his agent in such circumstances. He is
in the position of a purchaser for value without notice of the
plaintiff's rights and as such cannot be held liable on the doctrine
of following misappropriated funds. Thaf doctrine having failed,
the plaintiff cannot stand as a preferred creditor of the defendant.
Whether he can become a general creditor depends on his ability
to sustain an action at law or a bill in equity upon some other
theory of his case.
*Eggleston v. Mason & Co.. 84 Iowa. 630 (j892); Henry v. Wilkes, 37
X. Y. 562 ( 1809) : Kelley v. Lindsay, 7 Gray. 287 (1856) ; Perkins v. Boothby,
71 Me. 91 (0S8o): Whitwell ci al.. v. Warner ct al.. 20 Vt. 425 (1848);
Spooner v. Thompson. 48 Vt. 259 (1876). Contra: McDermott v. Jackson,
97 Wis. 64 (1897); -Nat. Bank v. Herne. 121 I11. 25 (1886). The cases denoted contra are in effect dicta only. The recovery given is not based upon
the following of misappropriated property, hut upon the quasi contractual
prounds of a benefit received.
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B. TRUSTEE AND CEsTUI-Q UE TRiST.
In this connection the case is aissumed to arise where -the
fraud-feasor is a trustee and the defendant either his cestids quc
trust or the trust estate, or both. The ground upon which the
recovery is sought must be the same, and depends upon whether
notice to a trustee is notice to the trust estate or to the cesluis quc
trust. It is unnecessary to examine in general the subject of
the binding force upon the cestui que trust of equities of third
persons known to the trustee. There can be no doubt that,
though under certain circumstances the beneficiary may become
bound by knowledge possessed by the fiduciary, he will not be
where a principal under similar conditions would not be charged
by notice to his agent. Thus if a trustee purchased negotiable
paper with trust funds and subsequently the cestui ratified the
purchase, the equities between prior parties to.the paper known
to the trustee might become binding upon the ccstui, though this
is doubtful. 63" . But where the interest of the trustee is adverse
to the beneficiary, his knowledge would be no more imputable
than would that of an unfaithful agent. Both the trustee and
the agent are fiduciaries in the broad sense, differing only in
legal contemplation. An eminent authority on the history and
origin of legal relations says originally there was no distinction
between agency, trusteeship, or bailment.64 It is, therefore, subinitted that if under similar circumstances, the doctrine of following misappropriated property would not give the plaintiff a right
of recovery from a principal, it will not aid him against a trust
estate or the cestuis quc trust.6

If these observations upon the subject are sound. it appears
that upon the view first adopted of the facts of the hypothetical
case, no theory can be advanced upon which a recovery of the
' To establish the ratification of any particular act performed by a trustee,
the facts involved must not only be proven, but it must be shown that such
ratification was made with full knowledge of all the material particulars and
circumstances. St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 88 N. W. 256 (Minn. x9ox);
Smith v. Howlett, 5i N. Y. S. 9io (x898).
2 Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law, 226-231.
' In Newell %. Hadley. Mass. x91o, supra, the rules of imputation of

notice were made interchangeable as to the two relationships. Knowlton,
C. J., did not adopt this but held that since imputation of notice could not
be maintained as to a principal under the circumstances, that was sufficient
to dispose of the case between trustee and cestui que trust.
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money or property by the plaintiff can be.sustained. To reach
such a conclusion is to disagree with the majority-of the court
in Massachusetts. Respect for that court has made desirable
an extended examination .of the cases cited for the principle
of imputation of notice there adopted, but it is conceived these
cases do not support the conclusions drawn from them, and that'
their real meaning has been indicated above,
HI.

A. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
In this division of the subject the agent is. regarded as
having directly paid the debts of his principal's business with
the plaintiff's money. The sole gfound of the liability is the
benefit conferred. The plaintiff can hardly be regarded as a
volunteer or an officious interloper, and. his rights are there.
fore not barred on that account.';" His money has gone to pay
that which otherwise it would have been the -defendant's legal
duty to pay.
Some jurisdictions have allowed recovery in such case in
an action at law on the common count for money had and
received. In others, notably in New England. the right at law
is denied. In Illinois, an agent without authority from his
principal, guaranteed a note in the latter's name and thereby
procured its discount, and applied the proceeds to the business
of the principal. It was held in an action at law, that. as to the
amount used in his business, the principal was liable pro tanto on
the guaranty." The decision rests upon principles of quasicontract or equity in the court of law."' In Wisconsin, a similar
result was reached, though the decision is inextricably confused
in language, at least, with principles of ratification.0 9 In Maine
the cases are uniform in allowing a recovery at law to the extent of the benefit conferred upon principles of quasi-contract.
Where an agent borrowed money without authority in the name
"Picksley v. Starr, 27 N. Y. S. 616; Inhabitants of So. Scituate v. Hanover, 9 Gray, 420.
' Nat. Bank of Las Vegas v. Oberne. 121 11. 25 (1886).
Moses v. McFerlan, 2 Barr, iooS.
" McDermott v. Jackson. 97 Wis. 64 (1897).
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of his principal and applied the proceeds to pay the legal obligations of the business, the lender was allowed to recover at
law.1 " In England-there is a decision inaccord,- allowing the
action at law; 71 but a later dictum to the contrary.7 2 Massachusetts holds contra to these cases through an uniform line of
cases.,- It is'said, "it is not enough to create a liability that
the defendant had the benefit of the money by reason of its being
expended in his business or in the payment of his debts." 7- And
although the action in that case was at law, the character of he
action is equitable and is always so recognized even in Massachu:
setts2 5 In Vermont, the same result is reached.-" It is said,
"Though money is borrowed by an agent on the credit of a
principal without authority, anti is used by the agent to pay the
debts of the principal's business which he is .managing, the principal is not liable therefor. in the absence of a promise to pay."
The success of an action at law depends therefore, upon the
jurisdiction in which it is brought. In those denying recov&y
at law, redress must be sought by another proceeding, if at all.
A late English decision has allowed the plaintiff to maintain a bill in equity to recover the money or the proceeds of
his property. to the extent it has passed to the benefit of the
defendant in the payment of the legal obligations of his busi-

ness.77 Romer. L. J., states the equitable rule thus: "Vlere
' Perkins v. Boothby. 71 Me. ot (i88o); Billings v. Inhabitants of Mon*mouth,72 Me. z74 (iS81), where the defendant was a municipal corporation.

"Reid v. Rigby Co., (1894), 2 Q. B. 40.
'Romer, L. J., in Ballantyne v. Mclver (i9o6), i K. B. 103, -log."Kelley v. Lindsay. 7 Gray. 287 (A856): Railroad Bank v. Lowell. zo9
Mass. 214 (1872); Agawam Nat. Bank v. South Hadley. 128 Mass.
5o3 (i88o); Allen v. So. Boston Railroad. i5o Mass. 200 (1889): Craft
v. Same, iden, 207; Foote v. Cotting, j95 Mass. 55 (z907), 15 L. R. A. (N. S.)

693.

" Dewey. J., in Kelley v. Lindsay. supra, at p. 29o.
'Morton, J., in Claflin v. Godfrey, 21 Pick. i, 16, speaking of assumpsit
for money had and received, "It approaches nearer to a bill in equity than
any other common law action: and. indeed, has many of the advantages
. . . of a chancery suit." See Cole v. Bates. 186 Mass. 584, 586. In Hunt
v. Amidon, 4 Hill. 345 (N. Y.). Walworth. C., says. "the courts of law, a long
time since, fell in love with a part of the jurisdiction of chancery and substituted the equitable remedy of an action of assumpsit upon the common
counts for the more dilatory and expensive proceeding of a bill iu equity in
certain cases."
'Spooner v. Thompson. 48 Vt. 254) (t8;6).
" Bannatyne v. McIver, su pra.
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money is borrowed on behalf of a principal -by an agent, the
lender wrongly believing the agent has authority, then, although
the principal caamot be sued at law. 8 yet in equity, to the extent
to which the money borrowed has in fact beep applied in paying
legal debts and obligations of the principal, the lender is entitled to stand in the same position as if the money had originally
been borrowed by the principal." . It seems there would be no
objection to extending this proposition to the case where the
money was.not borrowed by the agent, but stolen or otherwise
unlawfully procured."'
It is well to note at once the limitations put upon this rule.
The right is co-extensive only with the application of the plaintiff's money to the .payment of debts and obligations, recoverable
from the principal. The underlying equity- of the doctrine is
said to be the same that governs the right in equity of one
who lends to a wife, and the cases dealing with ultra vires contracts of corporations. The first class seems to have originated in
an English decision in i718. s ' It is there held that one who lends
money to a wife to buy necessaries may stand against the
husband in equity in the place of him who furnishes the same,
though at law the lender of money to a wife would be without
remedy. '' This decision has been followed in America.8 3 A
case governed by the same principle is that of a lender to an
4
infant when the money is used to buy necessaries.S
The second class of cases deals.with instances of borrowing by corporations as an ultra v'ires act, the proceeds being used
to pay subsisting liabilities of the company." ' . Some doubt has
existed as to the proper ground upon which these cases should
be rested. The earlier cases undoubtedly invoke the doctrine of
OCf. Reid v. Rigby Co., Eng., 1894, ubi supra.
"At p. zog.
'Newell v. Hadley, supra.
" Harris v. Lee, i P. NVms. 482.
' Knox v. Bushell, 3 C. B. N. S. 334.
U Kenyrm v. Faires. 47 Conn. 5io; Kenny v. Meislahn. 75 N. Y. S. 8i
(1902) ; Walker v. Simpson, 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 83 (setble). Contra, Skinner
v. Tonell, 159 Mass. 474.
"Marlow v. Pitfield, i P. \ms. 559 (1718).
" Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Co.. 19 Q. B. D. 155 (1887) ; lot re Cork
v. Youghal Ry. Co.. L. R. 4 Ch. 748.
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equitable subrogation. 0 An examination of the more recent
cases indicates this theory may have been or will be abandoned and
a principle of "equity and good conscience" adopted. -In an early
decision it is said, "The court closes its eyes to the true facts of
the case, viz., an advance as a loan -by the quasi-lender to the
company, and a payment by the company to its creditors as out
of its own monies; and assumes on the contrary that the quasilender and the creditor of the company met together and that
the former advanced to the latter the amount of his claim against
the company and took an assignment of that claim for his own
benefit." I The length to which this fiction has been carried,
permitting the recovery of money applied to the payment of
debts incurred after the quasi-lending, shows the- assignment to
be a true fiction. 8 Lord Selborne, C., has marked the limitation of the theory, "The test is, has the transaction really added
to the liabilities of the company? If the amount of indebtedness remains in substance unchanged-

*

*

*

and nothing is

really added to the liability of the company, there has been no
real transgression of the principle on which they are prohibited
from borrowing." S The complete adoption of the fictitious assignment would entitle the so-called assignee to all the securities
and priorities of the satisfied creditor. But this has been distinctly denied in England. s This of course leads to a repudiation
of the remarks of Fry, L. J.. and the theory of subrogation.
Lindley, M. R., rests the decision upon an equitable limitation
of the doctrine of ultra.vires. The prohibition against borrowing more than a given sum is, in reality and substance, disobeyed only when an obligation to pay more than that is contracted. The application of the money borrowed shows whether
the obligations of the company have been made excessive. Inquiry
in this respect is, therefore, made by the courts of equity. The
object of the inquiry is to ascertain- to what extent the money
borrowed from the plaintiff has extinguished other debts of the
U9 Columbia Law Review, 63.
"Fry, L. J., in Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Co., supra, at p. i65
"Idem.
- Blackburn Bldg. Soc. v. Cunliffe, 22 Ch. D. 61 (1882).
"In re Wrexham, etc., Ry. (j899). i Ch. 44o; but see Blackburn Bldg.
Soc. v. Cunliffe, 29 Ch. D. 902 (885).
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company, thus preserving the same total indebtedness. This
amount is the extent of the plaintiff's recovery. This is
clearly set forth by Giffard, L. J., "inasmuch as his money had
gone to pay bills which could be recoverable at law." 91 In the
last English case in which the principle has been utilized, an account was directed to ascertain how far claims for which the
defendants were held legally liable, had been paid.92
Thus it will be seen, irrespectivi of the reasons upon
which
these cases rest, the limitation of the plaintiff's right is the
same. Under neither reasoning can lie -recover to a greater
amount than the total of extinguished legal claims against the
defendant. "3 This makes it appear that, even in jurisdictions
where recovery by the plaintiff would not be permitted at law,
a proceeding in equity would be successful. For what reasons
this difference between law and equity should be taken, is not
made clear. As has been pointed out, Massachusetts recognizes
that the action for money had and received is governed by equitable principles, and that this present plaintiff has a sufficient
equity in his behalf to maintain a bill, but denies him recovery
in assumpsit. It is true the money must be received to maintain
the latter, but that has not been the difficulty encountered in
Massachusetts. In England the present circumstances are held
to constitute a sufficient receipt of'the money. 94 However, in so
far as the proceeds of the agent's wrong have gone to pay the
debts of the defendant, his principal, it would seem the plaintiff
may recover; in some jurisdictions at law, in others by bill in
equity averring the absence of legal remedy. Though it has been
seen that the plaintiff cannot claim as a preferred creditor, in the
case of agency, either-by a proceeding at law or in equity, henmay
have a judgment as a general creditor.
" Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Co., supra, at p. 65.

0 Bannatyne

v. McIver, supra.
" For cases in United States, see Aldrich v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 176 U. S.
6j8; Logan Co. Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 67; Pullman Co. v. Trans. Co.,
171 U. S. 135; Citizens Nat. Bank v. Appleton, 216 U. S. 196 (igio); Bank
of Lakin v. Nat. Bank, 57 Kans. j83 (1896).
Reid v. Rigby Co., supra.
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B. TRUSTEE AND CESTUI QUE TRUST.

Is the matter changed when the relationship between the
fraud-feasor and the defendant ceases to be that of agency, but
is a trust? It will be remembered that the trustee is a defaulter
to the estate to an equal or larger amount than the sums paid
by him to creditors. It is submitted that this circumstance renders considerations applicable to agency beside the mark when
applied to a trust. No legal or equitable debts of the defendant cestuis que trust were paid or extinguished when the
defaulting trustee used the Olaintiff's money to pay the debts incurred by him in executing the trust.'
As a trustee,. these debts were his legal obligationi, and
he alone was personally liable thereforY5 A trustee cannot-by contract bind his beneficiary on the trust estate at-law.9 _Accordingly if the language of the doctrine applied in the coiporation
cases is to be taken literally, ifis not applicable to the case now
under discussion, for no debts were-paid with' the plaintiff's
mohey which could have been recovered against the trust res or
the beneficiaries, at law. Even if the correct interpretation of
the principle is to include all claims which might have -been
recovered from the defendants at law or in equity, this will
not change the case where the trustee is a defaulter to the estate.
Even in equity, creditors of the trustee cannot charge the
trust res or the cestuis que trust for debts incurred in the management of the trust, where the trustee, if he had paid the debts,
would not have been entitled to indemnify himself from the
trust estate, being a defaulter."
It follows that the plaintiff cannot charge the estate or
the beneficiaries. Iis right depends upon what would have been
"Owen v. Delamere, 15 Eq. 134 (1872); Noyes v. Blakeman, 6 N. Y.'567
(1852); Poole v. Wilkinson, 42 Ga. 539 (187!).
" z5 Amer. Law Rev. 449; Stanton v. King, 15 N. Y. 4 (1876).
"In

re Johnson. L. R. 15 Ch. D. 548 (188o); In re Blundell, 44 Ch. D.

t

(i89o); Mason v. Pomeroy, 151 Mass. 164 (semtble). The right of these creditors of the trustee is to be subrogated to his rights against the estate when
he is insolvent. Tennant- v. Stoney. i Rich. Eq. 222 (1845); Leath -v.Ferry,
32 N. J. Eq. 79; Eisenstadt Jewelry Co. v. Mississippi Val. Tr. Co., 72 Mo.
App. 514 (1897). An anomalous doctrine prevails in Georgia where the right
of the creditor is regarded as an independent equity. \Vylly A%Collins &
Co., 9 Ga. 223 (185t). And see Louis D. Brandeis. Esq., in 15 Amer. L. Rev.
449. But see also Dr. Wm.Draper Lewis, in 9 Col. Law Rev.. at p. -6.
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the claim against them, of the creditors who have been paid
with his money. This in turn depends upon what would have,
been the right of the trustee to recoup himself from the trust res
had he fulfilled his contract with the creditors. In the end the
plaintiff's rights depend upon those of the trustee, -who is a
defaulter. It must be concluded, therefore, that the principles
which sustain an action or a bill against a principal in the.
case of agency, are not sufficient when the instance is one of
trust. The state of accounts and the right to indemnity between a disclosed principal and his agent, have no bearing on the
rights of creditors, but as between cestuis .que trust and the
trustee, these considerations are of the greatest importance.'
To summarize briefly, we find that upon but one theory and
in but one class of case, can the plaintiff- recover, that is, where
his action is against a principal whose debts the fraudulent agent
has paid with the money or proceeds of the property wrongful3
procured from the plaintiff. In such case he may succeed in an
action arising in quasi-contiract in some jurisdictions; in others
only by bill in equity. He becomes a general creditor of the
principal but no more. But where the fraudulent person is a
trustee, and he is himself in arrears to the trutt estate, the plaintiff is without relief upon any theory, save his unprofitable right
against the trustee personally. In allowing recovery to the plaintiff in such a case.- it is thought the Massachusetts ease of
Newell v. Hadlev, supra, is wrong, both as to the erroneous
statement of a rule for the imputation of notice, and according
to prevailing doctrines, in failing to distinguish between agency
and trusteeship in connection with a creditor's right against a
principal and the trust r,'s or cestii respectively.
Ralph J. Baker,
Philadelphia. Pa.

